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Abstract
Wars are increasingly frequent, and the trend has been steadily upward since 1870. The
main tradition of Western political and philosophical thought suggests that extensive
economic globalization and democratization over this period should have reduced appetites
for war far below their current level. This view is clearly incomplete: at best, confounding
factors are at work. Here, we explore the capacity to wage war. Most fundamentally, the
growing number of sovereign states has been closely associated with the spread of
democracy and increasing commercial openness, as well as the number of bilateral conflicts.
Trade and democracy are traditionally thought of as goods, both in themselves, and because
they reduce the willingness to go to war, conditional on the national capacity to do so. But
the same factors may also have been increasing the capacity for war, and so its frequency.
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The Frequency of Wars
‘War made the state and states made war’ (Tilly 1975, p. 42).
Wars are becoming more frequent. More precisely, the frequency of bilateral militarized
conflicts among independent states has been rising steadily over 130 years. In this paper we
consider how to evaluate this as a fact, how to explain it, and how to respond to it.
Part I of the paper reviews the data, and finds cause for concern. Part II outlines some
reasons for puzzlement. The puzzle is that the world has become more globalized and more
democratic; on both counts it should have got more peaceful, not less. In Part III we go back
to the data. We find that the rising frequency of conflict is everywhere; it is not explained by
a few bellicose powers. We show the answer to the puzzle will be related to the changing
number of states. In Part IV, we discuss the historical relationship between war and state
formation. In Part V, we raise some issues about how the factors conducive to peace and
war have been analyzed in the literature and suggest lines of further investigation, in
particular underlying determinants of state capacity for war. Technological, fiscal, and
commercial aspects of the capacity for war are discussed in Part VI; the issue here is that
these capacities are promoted by the same forces of democratization and globalization that
are supposed to discourage conflict. Part VII concludes that, if the frequency of conflict has
been increasing, it may not because we want it; more likely, it is “Because we can.”
I.
Many indicators of interstate conflict have been flat or declining for decades or longer. This
includes the number of wars in each year since 1826 (Kristian Gleditsch 2004, p. 243), the
number of military fatalities in each year since 1946 (Joseph 2008, p. 114), and the annual
probability of bilateral interstate conflict, which was trending upwards between 1870 and
1914, has been in decline since 1950 (Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig 2008, p. 866). In the most
recent years, despite conflicts associated with the breakup of the Soviet and Yugoslav states
in the early 1990s, the downward trends have continued (Nils Gleditsch 2008, pp. 693-694).
One indicator has moved persistently in the wrong direction. How many countries are at
war at any given time? Exploiting the Uppsala dataset on armed conflicts, backdated to 1946
(Nils Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, and Strand 2002) and updated to 2005,
Joseph (2008) has noted upward trends in the annual percentage shares of all countries in
the world that are at war, and of all possible country-days at war, over the postwar period.
Nils Gleditsch (2008, p. 694) has dismissed these observations as statistical artifacts of a
trend to coalition wars in which countries participate symbolically, at increasing distance,
without ever exchanging fire with the adversary. This comforting inference is undermined,
however, by another observation (Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig 2008, p. 867): between the
1950s and the 1990s, the average distance separating country pairs at war fell by one half
(from more than 5,000 kilometers to less than 2,500).2
Using the Correlates of War dataset, updated in 2007,we trace the origin of the upward
trend in the frequency of bilateral conflicts as far back as 1870.
1 We show that it has
proceeded with surprisingly little interruption through two World Wars nearly to the present
day. Befitting a phenomenon that is older than the oldest person alive today, we suggest
that deep causes are at work.
≪Figure 1 near here.≫
Figure 1 charts the number of pairs of countries that have disputed with each other in
each year from 1870 to 2001. This is a greater number than the number of wars for two
reasons: first, it accounts for the number of countries involved in each conflict, rather than
the number of conflicts; second, it has wider coverage than formal states of war, because it
includes displays as well as uses of military force. The chart measures the number of
pairwise disputes on a logarithmic scale, partly to give a clear picture of what has happened
at the lower frequencies.
Viewed in this way, the chart demonstrates a clear log-linear trend; the frequency of
bilateral conflicts has been rising steadily for over a century at two per cent per year.
2 To be
sure, there was a good deal of disturbance around the two world wars. But the surprising
character of this disturbance is as follows: between 1914 and 1945, the conflicts that would
normally have been distributed across the three decades arrived a little early and were
squeezed into World War I, or were delayed until World War II, with an unexpected lull in
between. After 1945, however, the frequency of conflict snapped back to the same trend it
had followed up to 1914 and continued on that path through to the end of the millennium.
In principle, the number of pairwise conflicts in a time period, or the absolute frequency,
is the product of two underlying variables into which it can therefore be decomposed. One
component is the number of country pairs, which has increased enormously since the
nineteenth century. In 1870 the world contained fewer than 50 independent states. By the
end of the twentieth century, there were more than 180. This was associated with the
breakup of empires (Austro-Hungarian, German, Ottoman, Russian, French, British, Dutch,
Belgian, Portuguese, and Soviet) and federations (Czechoslovak and Yugoslav). As a result
the total number of possible country pairs in the world between whom relations of peace or
war could exist grew from around one thousand to over 17,000.
≪Figure 2 near here.≫
After the increase in the number of possible pairs is stripped out of the data, we are left
with the other component, the relative frequency of conflicts, that is, the absolute frequency
of pairwise conflict normalized for the number of pairs. The number of countries since 1870
1 This is the Militarized Interstate Disputes dataset, described by Ghosn, Palmer, and
Bremer (2004); we refer to version 3.1 (2007). The time series we use are reported in an
unpublished Appendix, Table A1, available from [URL].
2 We can reject a unit root at the 5% level, although not at the 1% level. Hence the series
is quite close to stationary. In empirical political science, war is generally acknowledged to
be auto-regressive in the sense that conflict in one period makes conflict more likely in the
next. If our series of conflict frequency is regressed on time and itself with a one-year lag,
there is around 50% year-on-year persistence. Controlling for that, the underlying trend
growth rate is reduced to about 1 per cent year, but this trend is very significant. For details
see the Appendix, Table A2 and A3.3
and the relative frequency of conflicts among them are shown together in Figure 2. As the
chart shows, in the first 80 years the number of countries did not change much; the relative
frequency of disputes fluctuated wildly and tended to rise. Then, over the next half century,
the relative frequency of disputes fell back to the level of the 1870s and below, but the
number of countries increased dramatically and this took over as the main driver that kept
the absolute number of conflicts on its upward trend. Thus, the steady increase in the
absolute frequency of conflicts was driven, statistically speaking, by quite different forces in
different periods.
Historically it is very interesting. From a present-day standpoint, should we feel
concerned? Normalized for the number of country pairs, the relative frequency of war does
not show a trend and is lower today than in the 1870s. This might seem to reassure, but
should not do so. Normalized for the number of planets that all countries must share – that
is one, exactly – the absolute frequency of conflict today is similar to what it was during
World War I. (The intensity of conflict measured by forces and expenditures is much lower,
admittedly; we do not face death and destruction on the scale of the Great War.) We have
more conflicts now than then, apparently, only because we have more states.
The number of states is not an exogenous or random variable, however. When new
states come into being, what motivates them is the demand for sovereignty (Alesina and
Spolaore 2003). And sovereignty includes decisions over peace – and war – with neighbors,
including former compatriots. In fact it is not at all uncommon for new states to plunge into
war, like Serbia or Georgia, or be born out of war, like Kosovo. If state formation and war
frequency are indeed linked, and the linkage has a clear historical dimension, this should
motivate historians to enquire more deeply into the nature of the connection.
II.
The data are a surprise, given the longstanding traditions of western political and
philosophical thinking on the future of war. According to these traditions, the global trends
towards democracy and globalization should make war increasingly a minority sport. In fact,
war is a minority sport. The problem is that the minority has been growing.
The expected relationship between war and globalization is, on the face of it, clear cut.
For many reasons, modern states ought to prefer trade to war. On the eve of World War I,
Norman Angell (1910, pp. 76-77) wrote:
Men are fundamentally just as disposed as they were at any time to take wealth that
does not belong to them. But their relative interest in the matter has changed. In very
primitive conditions robbery is a moderately profitable enterprise ... But to the man
whose wealth so largely depends upon his credit, dishonesty has become as precarious
and profitless as honest toil was in more primitive times.
In more contemporary terms, trade is a positive-sum interaction; war is negative-sum.
Trade costs have fallen (Jacks, Meissner, and Novy 2008); war costs are high and rising
(Edelstein 2000, pp. 336-350; Stiglitz and Bilmes 2008; Glick and Taylor 2010). Victory in war
can bring one-sided gains but the gains are reversible if conflict is renewed. And, in wars of
choice, victory is not only uncertain but unlikely. On the record of all wars since 1700, to
start one attracts a 60 percent probability of defeat (Eckhardt 1989).4
More or less the same tradition affirms that the spread of democracy should crowd war
out of the global community. Whoever else they fight, the evidence is compelling that
‘Liberal or democratic states do not fight each other’ (Levy 1988; Russett 1995).
The reasons have been much debated. According to one interpretation, democratic
norms make leaders more likely to exercise self-restraint. Possibly, moral constraints are
weakened when the foreign state has an authoritarian ruler (Doyle 1986; Russett 1993;
Maoz and Russett 1993). In another view, democratic institutions may constrain leaders to
resolve conflicts non-violently, abroad as at home, or punish them more severely or more
certainly if they embark on violence, or if they resort to war and lose. If democracies are
thereby more selective about the wars they fight, and so more likely to win them, other
states (or more specifically other democracies) may be less likely to attack them. Autocrats,
in contrast, can steal the benefits of war while shifting the costs onto their subjects and
avoiding punishment (Maoz and Russett 1993; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995;
Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith 1999; Bueno de Mesquita, Smith,
Siverson, and Morrow2003; Bueno de Mesquita 2006; Jackson and Morelli 2007).
The democratic peace continues to be debated. Where skepticism persists, it is often
based on counter-examples, such as the wars undertaken by the United States, the world’s
largest rich democracy. According to Rosato (2003, p. 599; 2005), the democratic peace was
‘an imperial peace based on American power’; the United States enforced peace among the
democracies after 1945 because the Cold War allowed it to, and made war against some
dictators for the same reason. In this view the democratic peace was a temporary accident.
A more popular and radical criticism sees the democratic peace as a sham; it detects the
hand of aggressive American imperialism intervening with rising frequency in resource
conflicts around the globe (e.g. Pelletière 2004).
In themselves, counter-examples may be of questionable significance because they can
always be interpreted otherwise than as grounds for refutation: they may reflect
randomness, or selection bias, or the influence of confounding factors (Doyle 2005; Kinsella
2005; Slantchev, Alexandrova, and Gartzke 2005). In the next section we will consider
specifically whether the rising frequency of wars might be attributable to one rich country or
a small group of them.
Some other recent qualifications to the democratic peace are of interest. Here are a few.
First, Downs and Rocke (1994) have noted that elected leaders that face punishment by the
electorate because their policies are failing have an incentive to gamble on resurrection, for
example by starting wars or by persisting with them, in the hope that something will turn up.
This argument has been applied to Iraq by Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008), as well as generalized
by Majumdar and Mukand (2004).
Second, observing the record of the former Soviet and Yugoslav states, Mansfield and
Snyder (1995, 2002, 2005) have proposed that new or incompletely established democracies
are particularly vulnerable to risky adventures in nation-building (for discussion see Narang
and Nelson 2009; Mansfield and Snyder 2009). Georgia seems to have supplied recent out-
of-sample confirmation. Along similar lines, Baliga, Lucca, and Sjöström (2010) suggest that
limited democracies might on balance be still more aggressive than dictatorships, if leaders
are uncertain about the aggression of their neighbors and face a challenge from a hawkish
minority in their own country.5
Doyle (2005) has suggested that democracy is a dynamic process qualified by values and
institutions at the same time. The democratic peace rests, he argues, on a tripod of
republican representation, commitment to human rights, and transnational
interdependence that falls when any one leg is missing.
Finally Conconi, Sahuguet, and Zanardi (2008) have looked in the data to find that
democracies where leaders are subject to term limits are as likely to make war as autocratic
states – and term limits are increasingly widespread. It is the democracies without term
limits, where established leaders retain the option of continuing to compete for office, that
account for the democratic peace.
≪Figures 3 and 4 near here.≫
In short, the idea that democratization necessarily spreads peace has been qualified in
various ways. We question whether these qualifications are adequate to the task of
explaining a trend towards the rising frequency of war that has persisted for 130 years. The
full difficulty is illustrated in Figures 3 and 4 which deal, respectively, with the spread of
democracy and trade. In Figure 3 we report an average measure the net balance of
democratic versus authoritarian attributes of political systems across all countries in the
world in each year.
3 This measure shows clearly the spread of democracy in the late
nineteenth century, reversed by the rise of fascist, communist, and military dictatorships
that began in the 1920s and continued through the 1970s. Beginning in the 1980s,
democracy swept around the world once more, but it was not until the new millennium that
average scores exceeded historical records. Figure 4 shows the average of a standard
measure of trade openness over the same period. It reflects a relatively open global
economy in the late nineteenth century, the profound setback to globalization of the
interwar period, and a recovery that began in the 1950s, recovered to the level of the
previous century in the 1970s, and went on to far exceed it.
These charts show clearly that the world in the year 2001 was more open and more
democratic than the world of 1870 – and also more conflict ridden. It is true that trade and
democratization grow together. From study of the endogenous relationship between trade
and democratization since 1870, López Córdova and Meissner (2008) confirm that more
open countries have been consistently more democratic. Most likely trade has tended to
drive democracy, but with long lags and through uncertain and varying channels. But on our
own figures, as trade and democracy have spread, so have wars. Over significant sub-
periods, for example from 1870 to 1913 and from the mid-1970s to 2001, the positive
associations of openness and democratization with the absolute frequency of wars have
been particularly close. Thus, if we have not got the general relationship between economic
and political progress and war completely and utterly wrong, to say the least, we have
missed some important confounding factors.
III.
In this section we explore the data in cross section and time series. Intially, we ask whether
the rising frequency of wars is attributable to a single country or small group of countries.
3 Other studies tend to report a single measure, the Polity 2 variable which aggregates
and nets various dimensions of democratic and authoritarian rule. See for example Martin,
Mayer, and Thoenig (2008).6
Consider the United States. We are all aware of America’s wars, but the result is a selection
bias. The share of the United States in the global count of pairwise conflict-years was 9.3
percent from 1870 to 1945, 11.2 percent from 1946 to 1991, and 10.8 percent from 1992 to
2001. Subtracting the conflicts of the United States from the global series makes little
difference to its level and no difference to its upward trend.
4
≪Figures 5 and 6 near here.≫
≪Table 1 near here.≫
More generally, Figures 5 and 6 show that the propensity to originate militarized
disputes is everywhere, in all parts of the global income distribution. Countries with larger
GDPs (Figure 5) have a tendency to throw their weight around somewhat more often than
others. Table 1 makes this more precise. The upper block of shaded cells in the table shows
figures for the whole period; all countries are ranked by GDP in every year. We find that, of
all those originating a dispute, the median country was ranked at 0.74 in the global GDP
distribution at the time; in other words, one half of countries originating conflicts had GDPs
larger than 74 percent of all countries at the time. We also measure the quartile points of
the distribution: one quarter of countries originating conflicts had GDPs larger than 94
percent of all countries at the time, while one quarter had GDPs smaller than half of all
countries. This bellicosity is an attribute of size, however, not of development level. Figure 6,
and the remaining rows of Table 1 show that countries that are richer in GDP per head are
not disproportionately responsible for the instigation of conflicts. The lower block of shaded
cells, covering the whole period, shows that one quarter of countries originating conflicts
had incomes per head higher than 76 percent of all countries at the time. Thus, the role of
these countries in the frequency of conflicts was nearly perfectly in proportion to their
numbers.
Wars are everywhere and their frequency has been rising everywhere, but the relative
contributions of countries at different points of the global income distribution have hardly
changed; this is seen both in the linear time trends in Figures 5 and 6, and the stability of the
inter-quartile ranges over time in Table 1. Larger economies have contributed more than
their fair share of conflicts, but not a rising share. The share of richer economies in the
4 The influence of the United States in our data is possibly our most frequently asked
question when we have presented this work. Using FW for the annual pairwise frequency of
conflict, and t for time with 1871 as year zero, for our full dataset we get:
Ln(FW) = 0.6187 + 0.5344 AR(1) + 0.009387 year (N= 130, R
2 = 0.77)
with all coefficients significant at the 0.0001 percent level. Excluding conflicts involving the
United States, we get:
Ln(FW no US) = 0.5552 + 0.5419 AR(1) + 0.009245 year (N= 130, R
2 = 0.77)
and similar significance levels. For more detail see the Appendix, Tables A3 and A4.7
instigation of conflict is neither disproportionate nor rising. Poor countries, some of them
small, also start many conflicts.
5
Closer analysis of time series can sharpen our focus on this puzzle. First, the relationship
between militarized disputes on one hand and democracy and trade openness on the other
will emerge as statistically weak. Second, the changing number (and hence size) of states
should be a crucial factor in any explanation for the frequency of wars. Third, the statistics
will tell us that the relationship between these factors and the frequency of militarized
disputes is highly non-linear.
≪Tables 2 and 3 near here.≫
If we simply regress the number of militarized disputes on the degree of trade openness
and on the average degree of democratization (all in logs), and control for serial correlation
(Table 2, specification 1), we find that both openness and democracy significantly reduce the
frequency of war. Once we control for the number of states, however (specification 2), the
positive influence of democracy vanishes.
An econometric perspective allows us to explore whether the relationship among
variables is sufficiently well approximated as linear with all explanatory variables entering
separately, or more complex than this. Using Ramsey’s (1969) RESET test on specification 2,
we can test (specification 3) whether any transformation of the set of dependent variables –
including cross-products between them, such as effects of democracy and trade on country
formation – can improve the fit. While the linear specification initially appeared to fit the
data rather well with an adjusted R
2 of 0.77, the RESET test very clearly rejects this simple
model. It points us toward possible interactions between democracy, trade, and the number
of countries as well as potential nonlinearities in their effect on war over time. In short, we
should rethink how democracy and openness matter.
Before we leave econometrics, we carry out some robustness checks, specification 2
(controlling for the number of states) as our baseline. In Table 3, specification 4 examines
the effect of splitting our democracy measure into levels of political competition versus
executive restraint. Based on the powerful reasoning of Paul Collier (2009), we look for
evidence that stable democracy is founded on executive restraint, and the spread of the
latter might favour peaceful conflict resolution. But neither is significant.
We also check for the effects of eliminating pairwise conflicts involving the United States
from the dependent variable. This exclusion does not change much. Specification 5 reports
the effect of democracy as somewhat more positive, but still insignificant. Splitting
democracy into political competition and executive restraint also remains ineffective.
IV.
As illustrated by Figure 2 and Table 2, the upward trend in the frequency of wars is tightly
related to the increase in the number of sovereign states. Given the dramatic change in the
5 Which countries have accounted for most conflicts? Over the entire period and the
3,112 conflicts in Table 1, the United States comes in second place (originating 161 conflicts)
behind Russia/USSR (219). The United Kingdom (119) is fourth, following China (151).
Germany (97) is sixth, after Iran (112). France is tenth, after Israel, Turkey, and Iraq. Thus
middle- and low-income countries are well represented and even small countries are
present.8
number of states since 1870, and especially after the two world wars, an understanding of
this relationship seems to be crucial for any explanation of the absolute frequency of wars in
general, and of the role of democratization and trade in particular.
Empirical studies on the issue usually treat the changing number of countries as
exogenously given, and either use it as an additional control variable, or focus on the relative
frequency of wars standardized by the number of country-pairs (e.g. Martin, Mayer, and
Thoenig 2008). This approach can mislead, however, insofar as the incidence of warfare has
been at the heart of the process of state-formation and wars have served to create,
consolidate or destroy states. We take one lesson from Tilly (1975, p. 42) who, in the context
of the consolidation of the European state system, proposed that ‘war made the state and
states made war.’ Another lesson is available from Gibler (2007) who suggests that peace
and democracy are joint symptoms of stable borders, not the other way around.
If we limit our attention to the period after 1871, many wars in Europe and elsewhere
began in attempts to revise existing political borders, either as a struggle for independence
from empires – often supported by external powers – or as an effort to expand existing
empires. Tensions within the British Empire (for example the two Boer Wars) and within the
Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires in the build-up to World War I come to mind as
conflicts over the very number and size of independent political entities. The increase in the
number of states after 1918, largely due to the partitioning of the Austro-Hungarian and
Ottoman Empires, was not only a direct outcome of World War I; aspirations for the creation
of new independent states lay equally at the origins of the war (e.g. Henig 2002).
Similarly, World War II arose from Nazi Germany’s efforts to build an autarkic
continental empire, beginning with the subjugation and liquidation of independent states
such as Poland and Czechoslovakia (Overy 1987).
After 1945 the larger colonial empires were dismantled in a largely (if not entirely)
peaceful way. Many of the newly independent states were only weakly integrated by
European standards, however. They inherited fragmented populations and fragile economic
structures that were designed for an imperial periphery. In consequence, many of these
states were prone to militarized conflicts over boundaries, motivated either by ethnic
tensions or economic pressures. Comparing the challenges faced by African states to the
European experience of state formation, for example, Herbst (1990, p. 136) argued: ‘It
should be obvious that the incentives that African leaders have to incite wars for the
purpose of state-making are significant and may become much stronger in the future.’
Against this background, there is a clear case for treating the number and size of countries
as endogenous to the frequency of wars.
As we argued earlier, the data suggest that changes in the number of states not only
affect the absolute frequency of wars but also interact with the effects of democratization
and trade, and hence most probably affect the relative frequency of wars. Consider the
theoretical framework provided by Alesina and Spolaore (2003) who have highlighted
interactions between the formations of states on the one hand side and democracy, trade
openness, and the development of international institutions on the other. In a nutshell, they
argue, given all countries are composed of heterogeneous populations, global economic
integration should strengthen the formation of smaller independent states; so should
democratization, via tendencies of further decentralization and eventual separatism. The
global spread of democracy and declining trade costs after 1945, together with the observed9
increase in the number of states, seems to lend empirical support to these ideas. But it also
challenges our understanding of the frequency of wars.
Alesina and Spolaore (2003, p. 221) conclude by conceding that they have not explored
‘how a configuration of countries might affect the level of conflict’ except for the impact of
an ‘exogenous’ change in the likelihood of international conflict on state formation. Yet the
likelihood of international conflict is clearly not exogenous; it is what we would like to
explain.
V.
How much do we really know? Less than we should, apparently. There is a vast and long-
standing international relations literature on war and peace. The literature was once based
on intuitive inference from narratives and comparisons, but has been transformed over the
last thirty years by new data and the application of quantitative methods. Large-scale open-
access cross-country panel datasets have been created that deal with war and peace,
political regimes, and historical macroeconomic and trade variables.
6 We should know more
than ever before about the correlates of war and peace. Yet, what do we know?
As might be expected, the literature that has resulted, being voluminous, is of variable
quality. Not all of the data now available have been well used; among thousands of
regressions that have been reported are many with potentially biased or otherwise dubious
estimates, for example because of the neglect of fixed effects in pooled regressions (Green,
Kim, and Yoon 2001).
In some ways the present state of the field is reminiscent of the literature on global
economic growth and divergence a decade or more ago. Banerjee (2007) has described how
economists strayed into thinking of global development as a machine that produced growth
using levers labeled ‘investment,’ ‘education,’ and ‘trade.’ In much the same way, estimation
strategies have typically modeled global relations as a machine with big push-buttons
marked ‘democracy’ and ‘trade.’ Economists have learned, however, that, while the big
buttons have some power as statistical drivers of global development in the aggregate, their
power has intrinsic limits. The buttons become particularly unreliable when applied in the
context of any given country. One likely reason (Rodrik 2007) is that their operation is at
least partly confounded by unobserved cross-country variation in institutions.
Where next for the study of peace and war? Experience suggests three possible
correctives. One is to look inside the regressors: democracy and trade are complex
phenomena that may have multiple or non-linear effects. An example of work in this spirit
would be the investigation of term limits in democracies by Conconi, Sahuguet, and Zanardi
(2008), but other aspects are also likely to be deserving of closer study. Collier (2009) has
argued that electoral competition may impede effective governance for development unless
accompanied by checks on executive power. Intuitively, electoral competition without
6 See the Correlates of War project at http://www.correlatesofwar.org, the Polity IV
project at http://www.systemicpeace.org, the UCDP/PRIO (Uppsala Conflict Data Program at
the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, and International Peace
Research Institute, Oslo) dataset at http://www.prio.no, the Penn World Tables at
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu, and the national income and population dataset of Angus
Maddison at http://www.ggdc.net/maddison.10
executive restraint might be as damaging for international relations as it can be for domestic
development. As we have seen, however, our aggregate data do not confirm this.
Another desirable corrective is to seek reconciliation of cross-section results with what
time series and narratives tell us. The virtue of cross sections is that they enlarge the data;
but the fact is that we live our lives through time. When we ask what may happen next year,
it is not always helpful to be told what would happen if Argentina became Britain in a
timeless way, since countries (and country pairs) are likely to be otherwise different in ways
that we cannot control. Narratives of democratization in particular countries, for example,
have shed light on the hypothesis of democratic peace where pooled cross-section studies
have failed to do so or may even have misled. In principle fixed effects should exclude the
across-unit variation from the variation that is exploited for estimation, leaving only the
within-unit variation over time. However, this works only under some rather restrictive
assumptions, for example that the variation across units remains unchanged over time.
A third corrective is to rethink the units of analysis themselves, because it is not always
clear what the unit should be: the country or the pair, for example. We should not treat the
number of sovereign states and their capacity to wage war as exogenous. The nature of
‘state and legal capacity’ generally, and its relationship to propensities for peace and war,
are the subject of recent work by Besley and Persson (2008, 2009). Following their lead,
further research in this field should also incorporate issues of state-formation, institutional
change and openness. Such an agenda faces two obvious challenges. The first challenge is
that empirical studies into these issues must find a way to capture the process of state
formation as an endogenous variable. But the data are intrinsically unsuited to this. The data
currently used in empirical studies are defined on the lines of national state boundaries (for
example data on trade between states, state institutions, or conflicts between states). The
state made statistics, and statistics defined the state (e.g. Tooze 2001, pp. 1-39). Therefore,
we face great difficulty in treating changes in boundaries – that is, changes in the
geographical reach of institutions – as varying endogenously over time, and this is one factor
that tends to limit our focus to variation in the cross-section.
One solution might employ narratives and case studies that explore both developments
over time and interactions between regions. Another solution would followRamankutty,
Foley, Norman, and McSweeney (2002), Buhaug and Rød (2006), Wimmer and Min (2006)
and Michalopoulos (2008) who use data on a grid of equally sized regions that are defined
strictly by geographical position. Their data would require extension to cover institutional
characteristics including political independence, variables reflecting trade costs, and the
prevalence of conflict. This is a feasible but still enormous task.
A significant gain from this approach might be to weaken the intellectual barriers that
arise when statistics are based on state borders. In reality, a continuity of violence runs from
unorganized and organized crime through civil war to militarized interstate conflict. But
social science struggles to recognize this as a continuum of interconnected phenomena.
Instead, our data and models chop it up into artificial segments. Scholars specialize in one
segment or another. The possibility of integrating insights is diminished.
The second challenge arises directly from our earlier results and the broad trends visible
in the data. An understanding of the frequency of wars apparently needs to consider not
only the relationship of war to state formation, institutional change, and trade, but should
crucially consider all these factors as interrelated. For example, democratization may impose11
constraints on political leaders that reduce the probability of war and enhance trade
integration. Simultaneously, democratization might transform public finance and hence as a
by-product increase the capacity to wage war. Trade integration, by enabling countries to
consume outside their production possibilities, may also increase the capacity for war.
Hence, the second challenge is to open the ‘black boxes’ of institutions, boundaries, and
trade and inspect the multiple interactions through which each affects the frequency of war.
Put in a simpler way, a focus on the appetite or ‘demand’ for war is reasonable,
justifiable, and convenient if the number of states can be treated as exogenous; but this may
have led us to neglect ‘supply-side’ or capacity-for-war factors that are also relevant. We will
consider technological, fiscal, and commercial aspects of this at greater length. Globalization
and democratization both ought to have diminished the appetite for war – and may well do
so in cross section. But they may also have promoted the formation of states and the
capacity for war over long periods of time, and this may explain some of what we see in the
historical time series.
We frame the rest of our contribution as narrative, rather than as quantitative analysis.
This is for a variety of reasons, including the tentative nature of our investigation, but the
most important reason is that we see our existing statistical categories, within the frontiers
of given states, as too crude and artificially bounded to bear the weight of statistical
inference.
VI.
We consider the technological, fiscal, and commercial capacities for war. First, the relative
costs of destructive power have been declining for centuries. From the Middle Ages, they fell
more rapidly in western Europe than elsewhere. The result was a European comparative
advantage in the ‘gunpowder technology,’ reflected first in trade, then in conquest (Hoffman
2010). The growth of technological capacities for war has continued to the present day. A
preoccupation with public finances is likely to see only the rising unit cost of major weapon
systems; in place of horses and sailing vessels, we now have billion dollar planes and
hundred billion dollar warships. But the destructive power of these systems has risen even
faster than unit costs. The advent of atomic weaponry meant that the same destruction that
previously required the repeated application of mass bomber formations in multi-year
campaigns could be achieved by one plane and one bomb. ‘In terms of “bangs per buck”,’
writes Niall Ferguson (2001, p. 40), ‘military technology has never been cheaper.’
Competitive arms races followed inevitably. How could such weaponry become
affordable on a rising scale? There was fiscal as well as industrial revolution. In the Middle
Ages most citizens were poor, but that was not all. Tax compliance was low and sovereign
debt was unattractive to lenders. Often, rulers raised military forces in kind: local overlords
supplied the king with armed men and food. As a result, the ruler could wage external war
only by consensus of the nobility. Or the king raised taxes to pay the army; conditional on
having done so, he gained freedom of military action, but he could raise the taxes in the first
place only through the overlords, and this again required their consent. Nor could rulers
borrow to any great extent because, at this stage, there was no real distinction between
public finance and the personal finance of the king; lenders were reluctant, not knowing if
the king would be bound by his word, or if his debts would die with him.12
Comparative data suggest that no sixteenth-century ruler could extract more than 5 per
cent of GNP in central revenues from the territory of the kingdom (Karaman and Pamuk
(2010). The local burden on peasants might well be higher, but much of what could be raised
locally was dissipated locally in paying off overlords or tax farmers. Only adding to the size of
the kingdom could add to central revenues, but this risked diminishing returns as tax-raising
authority was delegated across a wider territory.
The seventeenth century saw a fiscal revolution in northwestern Europe. Dutch and
English fiscal ratios climbed to 10 and then 20 percent of national income. Patrick O’Brien
(2005) has charted the progress of this revolution in England between 1500 and 1800. In the
middle of these three centuries fall the English Civil War of 1642 to 1651 and the Glorious
Revolution of 1688. Before 1642 English revenues were only once, briefly, more than 5 per
cent of national income; after 1688, they were never less than that, and increasingly much
more.
What drove the transformation of public finance? The Civil War and the Glorious
Revolution destroyed absolutism and set new restraints on the executive – at least, the
executive was now restrained in everything but the making of war (O’Brien 2001, 2005;
Açemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2005). Abroad, the government aggressively promoted the
Atlantic trade by extending naval power, a policy that won taxpayers’ support and built tax
compliance. At home, credible guarantees against default widened the market for sovereign
debt. The result was to build public finance (Tilly 1975, 1990; Bonney 1994; Ferguson 2001).
Since other regions of Europe and the Near East did not follow, there was fiscal
divergence. Nomadic empires such as that of the Mongols failed because they could not
mobilize sufficient resources to compete with China or Russia (Perdue 1996). At the end of
the eighteenth century the fiscal ratio of an agrarian state like the Ottoman Empire
remained as it was. Through the nineteenth century, the gap widened (Cardoso and Lains
2010). In fact, by the early twentieth century the liberal democracies could put half or more
of national income into war. In World War I Germany did so too, but only by exhausting its
economy in the attempt to compete. In contrast, the agrarian empires of the Ottomans,
Romanovs, and Habsburgs struggled to mobilize their resources at all (Broadberry and
Harrison 2005).
Later in the century, the non-democracies caught up and eliminated the gap. The
extraordinary 60-to-70 percent fiscal ratios of Nazi Germany, militarist Japan, and the Soviet
Union in World War II stand out (Harrison 1998). Behind this lay the fact that, by World War
II, dictators of varying hues had learned to substitute the instruments of modern nationalism
and modern repression for their adversaries’ advantages of fiscal transparency and
voluntary tax compliance.
What the dictators could not match was the capitalist democracies’ commercial
capacities for war. This aspect of state capacity is illustrated by a twentieth-century paradox.
Since the Napoleonic era, European governments have worried about food security. Britain
has relied overwhelmingly on imported calories. Despite this, in two world wars Britain had
little difficulty in feeding its people (Olson 1963). In contrast, those countries that believed
themselves secure were the first to run short of food. In the last quarter of the nineteenth
century Germany’s leaders worked hard to limit their exposure to international trade and to
protect agriculture. In 1914 Russia went to war, assured of the availability of a large13
peacetime surplus of exportable grains. Yet it was Russian and German cities that were
stalked by hunger (Offer 1989; Broadberry and Harrison 2005).
It was easier for Britain to feed itself from the other side of the world than for Berlin,
Vienna, St Petersburg, or Constantinople to induce farmers thirty miles distant from the
capital to feed their own people. Why was this? Britain had invested not in agriculture but in
something more important: the gains from international trade. These were not only direct
gains in the Ricardian sense of returns to specialization, but also indirect gains from the
establishment of an overseas trading network that would robustly survive the disruptions of
continental war. The Russian, German, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman Empires had inferior
external networks, although Russia was helped by peripheral membership of the Anglo-
French network. But there was more: these countries, with their large peasant populations,
could not maintain the integration of their own domestic markets under the pressure of
wartime mobilization. Unable to trade with the cities on peacetime terms, their peasant
farmers seceded from the war effort, retreating into subsistence activities, leaving the
soldiers and war workers without food.
To varying degrees, these countries had a commercial capacity for war that was greatly
inferior to Britain’s. They thought they were safe; they perceived the British to be at risk.
When war broke out, they expected Britain to starve. Using commerce rather than
agriculture, however, the British fed themselves to standards little short of peacetime
through two world wars. In both world wars, moreover, the Allies were able to multiply the
military value of coalition resources through long-distance economic cooperation that the
Central and Axis Powers could not match.
The lesson of this narrative is straightforward: war and trade are not exclusive. The same
conclusion can be reached in other ways, however. Using panel data from 1950, Martin,
Mayer, and Thoenig (2008) have shown that trade had a double effect on the relative
frequency of pairwise conflict. More bilateral trade reduced this frequency, but more
multilateral trade raised it. Over time both multilateral and bilateral openness increased on
average, but the net effect was positive. For any country pair separated by less than 1,000
kilometers, globalization from 1970 to 2000 raised the probability of conflict by one fifth
(from 3.7 to 4.5 percent). On the interpretation of Martin and his co-authors, the same
forces that widened the scope of multilateral trade made bilateral war less costly. As long-
distance trade costs fell, open economies could increasingly wage war against some (most
likely close by), while continuing to reap the gains from trade with others (at a distance).
This phenomenon might also offer a key to the weaknesses of economic sanctions identified
by Davis and Engerman (2003, 2006).
From various angles, therefore, it is possible to identify something that it is convenient
to call the commercial capacity for war; this capacity is increasing in trade liberalization, and
also in the information, communication, transportation, and transaction technologies that
account for much of modern economic growth.
VII.
The evidence suggests that, normalized by the number of countries in the world, the risk of
war is lower today than at the end of the nineteenth century. Normalized by the number of
planets we have to share, however, it is of the same frequency (if not intensity) as during14
World War I. There has been a steady upward trend in the number of bilateral conflicts over
130 years.
Existing explanations of the resort to war in terms of the political incentives facing rulers
subject to varying moral and cultural norms and constitutional arrangements, widespread in
modern political science and political economy, are clearly both necessary and productive.
We argue that an emphasis on preferences and incentives, which we call the demand side of
the decision for war, cannot fully or convincingly explain the aggregate picture. It is
necessary also to consider the supply side – the capacity for war. In this sense, we conclude,
if the frequency of conflict has been increasing, it may not because we want it; more likely, it
is “Because we can.”
The rising frequency of bilateral conflicts is reflected right across the global distributions
of countries by size and wealth. Wealthy countries are not responsible for more than their
share of conflicts, or for a rising share of conflicts. Countries that are economically above the
median of the economic size distribution do contribute more than their share, but the rising
trend is equally present among countries that are smaller (and poorer) than the median.
This rising trend may turn out to have been driven by things we would otherwise
welcome as global improvements. For example, the hunger for political participation and
national self-determination has been satisfied in many troubled regions, and this has led to
the formation of new states. The growing number of states is an important explanatory
factor in the rising frequency of wars, but this does not make the trend a statistical artifact
because the number of states is not exogenous.
In modern times just as much as in the Middle Ages, new states have been born amid
conflict. The demand for statehood is also a demand for the capacity to engage in national
self-determination by force, and each new state has added a focus for potential conflict.
With the downfall of empires, moreover, democracy has become more typical – and, with
democracy comes improved fiscal capacity. As a result, countries that adopt democracy are
likely to be able to raise taxes or borrow more in order to promote national adventures
without recourse to domestic repression.
With more borders there is more cross-border trade. Beyond this, moreover, falling
trade costs are another modern boon that has allowed many countries to benefit from
specialization and increased economic interdependence. Wider markets have in turn
increased the scope for smaller countries to self-insure against asymmetric shocks. A moral
hazard that we associate with insurance, however, is that the insured can then engage in
risky behavior at lower cost. In the same way, small states that reduce risks through
multilateral exchange may become more inclined to risky action in bilateral relations. To
complete the picture, continuously rising global productivity has lowered the costs of
production and consumption – and destruction, too.
We see lessons for policy and history. In policy terms, democracy is good, but without
nation there is no democracy, and nation-building is a double-edged process. Similarly,
falling trade costs and wider multilateral exchange have been powerful promoters of
economic growth and development, but may also have cheapened war. How can we
encourage democracy to spread in ways that don’t offer gains to nation-building
adventurists? How can we lock countries into regional or global trade without freeing their
hands for confrontational foreign adventures at shorter range? These questions may hold
some of the keys to a peaceful twenty-first century.15
For history, we have identified some unsolved problems in the relationship between
economic progress and organized violence, and we have proposed some answers. An
underlying issue is that our historical categories and statistics have been limited by the
existence of states and their borders. In historical reality, there is a continuum of violence
from organized crime through civil conflict to inter-state warfare. As violence flows from one
category to another, it drops out of one specialist field and one dataset and pops up in
others. There is a unified process to which the formation and destruction of states and state
borders is endogenous. This process challenges historians and social scientists to work
together to understand it.The Frequency of Wars: References
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Notes. Disputes are coded from level (1 no action) through 2 (threat of force), 3 (display of
force), 4 (use of force), and 5 (war). We use all disputes of level 3 (the closing of a border or
the dispatch of ships or troops) and above. For the full dataset, see the unpublished
Appendix, Table A1, available from [URL]. The shaded area delimits the 1914 to 1945 period.
Source. The Militarized Inter-State Disputes dataset, version 3.1, at
http://www.correlatesofwar.org, described by Ghosn et al. (2004).The Frequency of Wars: Figures
Figure 2. The relative frequency of pairwise militarized disputes and the number of

































































Sources. Conflict data as Figure 1. Number of countries from Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig
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Note. The shaded area delimits the 1914 to 1945 period.
Sources. Conflict data as Figure 1. Net democracy: the Polity2 variable from the Polity IV
dataset at http://www.systemicpeace.org, described by Marshall and Jaggers (2007).The Frequency of Wars: Figures










































Note. The shaded area delimits the 1914 to 1945 period.
Sources. Conflict data as Figure 1. Openness data from Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig (2008).The Frequency of Wars: Figures
























































Sources. As Table 1.
Note. The solid line is a linear time trend.The Frequency of Wars: Figures





























































Sources. As Table 1.
Note. The solid line is a linear time trend.The Frequency of Wars: Tables
Table 1. Pairwise conflicts, 1870 to 2001, and countries originating them, distributed by GDP











Conflicts 3112 326 603 1679 497
Conflicts per year 23.8 7.6 18.8 37.3 45.2
Percentile rank of countries that originated disputes,
By GDP:
Quartile 3 0.94 0.96 0.96 0.91 0.91
Quartile 2 (median) 0.74 0.79 0.85 0.72 0.72
Quartile 1 0.50 0.33 0.44 0.54 0.44
By GDP per head:
Quartile 3 0.76 0.75 0.79 0.77 0.72
Quartile 2 (median) 0.56 0.53 0.62 0.56 0.54
Quartile 1 0.30 0.26 0.33 0.28 0.29
Note. The upper block of shaded cells in this table can be read as follows. When all countries
are ranked by the size of their GDP in every year, we find that, of all those originating a
dispute, the median country was ranked at 0.74 in the global percentile GDP distribution at
the time. The country at the upper quartile was ranked at 0.94 and the country at the lower
quartile at 0.50. Thus, one quarter of countries originating conflicts had GDPs larger than 94
percent of all countries at the time, while one quarter had GDPs smaller than half of all
countries.
Sources. For this table, we merge two datasets, the Militarized Inter-State Disputes dataset,
version 3.1, at http://www.correlatesofwar.org, described by Ghosn et al. (2004), and the
national income and population dataset of Angus Maddison at
http://www.ggdc.net/maddison. In the Militarized Inter-State Disputes dataset we identify
countries that originated disputes of level 3 or higher, as defined in the notes to Figure 1.
We match 162 countries by name; many are straightforward, but we match Russia with
Russian Federation and USSR, Austria with Austria-Hungary, and Germany with German
Federal Republic. In each year we attach a percentile rank to all matched countries by GDP
and GDP per head. There are many missing observations in the Maddison dataset;
particularly before 1950, many countries are represented by infrequent benchmarks. To
lessen the risk of selection bias (since countries that are poorer in data tend also to be
poorer in income) we give each country with missing data its percentile rank from the year
when it is next observed. In this way, we create 3,112 matches out of 3,224 conflicts that
were originated between 1870 and 2001. We then find the percentile ranks by GDP and GDP
per head in each year of the countries originating disputes over the whole period and each
of the subperiods in the table. Unpublished data files are available at [URL].The Frequency of Wars: Tables
Table 2. Conflict, democracy, trade openness, and the number of countries
Dep. Variable =
Log(FW)









Constant 2.522 2.471 –5.424 –4.272 1.942 2.022
Log(Openness) –0.794 –1.925 –0.737 –2.620 0.017 0.111
Log(Democracy)
d –0.676 –1.624 –0.096 –0.262 0.184 1.408
Log(# of Countries) ... ... 1.602 8.205 –0.299 –1.404
AR(1) 0.900 25.529 0.651 7.241 0.229 10.033
Fitted Value
2 ... ... ... … –0.143 –1.281
Adj. R
2 0.727 0.762 0.770
Prob (RESET F-test) ... ... 0.024
DW-stat 2.666 2.333 1.950
# of obs 130 130 130
Notes.
a Ramsey’s (1969) RESET Test Statistics: F-Statistic: 4.251 (Probability: 0.04), Log
likelihood ratio: 4.382 (Probability: 0.036). The RESET test considers whether the inclusion of
further variables or non-linear combinations of the regressors makes a significant
contribution to explain the variation of the dependent variable.
b Based on Newey-West HAC Standard-Errors and Covariance.
Sources. FW is the conflict measure shown in Figure 1. Openness and # of countries: Martin,
Mayer, and Thoenig (2008). Democracy: the Polity2 (or net democracy), variable from the
Polity IV dataset at http://www.systemicpeace.org, described by Marshall and Jaggers
(2007), averaged over all sample countries for a given year.The Frequency of Wars: Tables
Table 3. Robustness tests
Specification 4 Specification 5 Specification 6
Dep. variable Log(FW) Log(FW no US) Log(FW no US)
Variable Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Constant –6.059 –4.014 –5.488 –2.396 –6.526 –3.878
Log(Openness) –0.773 –2.598 –0.803 –2.628 –0.851 –2.622
Log(Democracy) ... ... –0.207 –0.265 ... ...
Log(PolComp) –0.099 –0.070 ... ... –0.239 –0.166
Log(ExConst) 0.443 0.192 ... ... 0.701 0.304
Log(# of Countries) 1.601 7.095 1.638 6.723 1.623 6.818
AR(1) 0.647 7.331 0.655 9.464 0.652 8.122
Adj. R
2 0.760 0.764 0.763
DW-stat 2.323 2.180 2.170
# of obs 130 130 130
Note. Specification 4 tests specification 2 (from Table 2), splitting the democracy variable
into separate components for political competition and executive constraint (as Figure 5).
Specification 5 tests specification 2, eliminating pairwise conflicts involving the United States
from the dependent variable. Specification 6 tests specification 4, again eliminating U.S.
pairwise conflicts from the dependent variable.
Sources. As Table 2.The Frequency of Wars: Appendix



















FW FW noUS Demo-
cracy
Exconst Polcomp Openness
1870 47 4 2 -2.32 3.43 4.58 0.11
1871 46 5 5 -2.05 3.62 4.75 0.16
1872 43 5 5 -1.65 3.63 4.98 0.18
1873 43 4 3 -1.65 3.53 5.02 0.17
1874 43 2 2 -1.56 3.62 5.00 0.18
1875 43 4 3 -1.46 3.64 5.00 0.16
1876 44 8 7 -1.60 3.72 4.76 0.18
1877 44 4 4 -1.63 3.73 4.69 0.19
1878 46 8 7 -1.65 3.73 4.73 0.20
1879 46 2 2 -1.53 3.71 4.78 0.21
1880 46 4 3 -1.15 3.72 5.00 0.20
1881 46 4 4 -1.13 3.75 4.98 0.21
1882 45 4 4 -1.13 3.75 4.98 0.20
1883 44 3 3 -1.06 3.74 5.12 0.20
1884 44 4 4 -1.15 3.74 5.12 0.20
1885 44 8 6 -1.15 3.74 5.12 0.20
1886 44 6 6 -1.34 3.66 5.02 0.19
1887 45 6 6 -1.34 3.66 5.02 0.19
1888 45 5 3 -1.21 3.68 5.08 0.19
1889 45 3 1 -1.13 3.70 5.08 0.20
1890 45 4 4 -0.96 3.72 5.35 0.16
1891 45 6 5 -1.00 3.75 5.37 0.20
1892 45 1 1 -0.98 3.77 5.37 0.20
1893 46 5 4 -0.96 3.77 5.46 0.19
1894 46 3 3 -0.89 3.85 5.38 0.20
1895 46 7 6 -0.91 3.85 5.29 0.18
1896 46 6 6 -1.00 3.81 5.29 0.21
1897 46 5 5 -1.00 3.81 5.29 0.21
1898 46 10 9 -0.66 3.85 5.51 0.21
1899 46 4 4 -0.66 3.85 5.51 0.20
1900 46 8 6 -0.68 3.89 5.42 0.16
1901 46 5 5 -0.48 3.96 5.48 0.19
1902 47 8 6 -0.40 3.94 5.51 0.19
1903 48 6 3 -0.44 3.91 5.55 0.19
1904 48 6 4 -0.53 3.81 5.62 0.19
1905 49 7 5 -0.47 3.87 5.71 0.20
1906 48 5 4 -0.20 3.87 5.87 0.20
1907 47 6 6 -0.51 3.77 5.76 0.20
1908 48 9 8 -0.07 3.94 5.96 0.20
1909 49 9 8 -0.02 4.00 5.90 0.19
1910 49 9 8 0.21 4.02 5.87 0.19
1911 49 19 16 0.50 4.14 5.96 0.20
1912 48 12 11 0.56 4.14 5.96 0.21
1913 48 13 12 0.93 4.27 6.08 0.18
1914 47 27 23 0.63 4.12 5.90 0.17
1915 47 16 15 0.68 4.22 5.96 0.19
1916 46 15 11 0.78 4.28 5.96 0.22
1917 46 18 14 1.28 4.42 6.24 0.23
1918 54 32 27 1.54 4.50 5.98 0.20
1919 53 23 21 1.63 4.53 6.06 0.19
1920 59 20 17 1.80 4.55 6.00 0.18



















FW FW noUS Demo-
cracy
Exconst Polcomp Openness
1922 62 11 11 1.88 4.67 6.24 0.14
1923 62 11 11 1.56 4.57 6.12 0.15
1924 62 2 2 1.15 4.41 6.02 0.15
1925 63 6 6 0.94 4.30 5.85 0.16
1926 63 8 7 0.79 4.25 5.87 0.15
1927 64 9 8 0.69 4.23 5.92 0.15
1928 64 6 6 0.43 4.05 5.72 0.15
1929 64 4 3 0.18 3.98 5.65 0.14
1930 64 3 3 0.00 3.87 5.59 0.12
1931 64 6 6 -0.16 3.91 5.45 0.10
1932 65 7 6 -0.13 3.91 5.46 0.08
1933 65 8 7 -0.50 3.75 5.23 0.08
1934 67 14 13 -1.01 3.56 4.94 0.10
1935 67 11 11 -1.00 3.54 4.99 0.10
1936 67 11 11 -1.56 3.32 4.72 0.10
1937 66 15 15 -1.10 3.45 4.95 0.12
1938 66 13 13 -0.96 3.46 5.02 0.10
1939 65 37 37 -1.15 3.32 5.06 0.11
1940 61 67 66 -2.17 3.03 4.55 0.10
1941 54 33 29 -1.74 3.15 4.60 0.09
1942 52 31 31 -1.82 3.11 4.59 0.09
1943 52 18 18 -1.66 3.15 4.60 0.09
1944 55 14 14 -0.86 3.44 5.22 0.09
1945 62 19 18 -0.09 3.67 5.56 0.09
1946 65 9 7 0.09 3.97 5.74 0.12
1947 67 5 5 -0.16 3.82 5.68 0.15
1948 72 9 8 -0.11 3.88 5.46 ...
1949 74 24 23 -0.38 3.87 5.24 0.13
1950 74 21 19 -0.14 3.94 5.28 0.13
1951 75 18 16 -0.28 3.91 5.31 0.17
1952 75 21 20 -0.14 4.01 5.26 0.15
1953 77 23 19 -0.22 4.01 5.19 0.14
1954 81 25 21 -0.45 4.01 5.03 0.14
1955 83 31 30 -0.39 3.95 5.00 0.16
1956 86 29 24 -0.06 4.01 5.12 0.16
1957 88 17 14 0.05 4.06 5.05 0.16
1958 89 38 33 -0.45 3.81 4.85 0.13
1959 88 41 39 -0.26 3.87 4.90 0.13
1960 106 33 29 -0.74 3.77 4.49 0.14
1961 110 38 31 -0.87 3.75 4.44 0.14
1962 117 37 30 -0.85 3.81 4.42 0.14
1963 119 36 34 -1.17 3.65 4.32 0.14
1964 122 34 29 -1.21 3.68 4.30 0.15
1965 125 41 37 -1.26 3.63 4.18 0.15
1966 129 35 34 -1.35 3.54 4.23 0.15
1967 130 33 28 -1.64 3.42 4.14 0.15
1968 134 23 20 -1.48 3.42 4.20 0.16
1969 134 34 30 -1.78 3.31 4.08 0.17
1970 136 17 15 -1.77 3.35 4.10 0.18
1971 142 27 25 -2.20 3.25 3.85 0.18
1972 142 20 18 -2.55 3.17 3.66 0.18
1973 143 28 25 -2.49 3.23 3.70 0.21
1974 145 26 25 -2.38 3.24 3.75 0.27
1975 152 35 31 -2.37 3.26 3.67 0.26
1976 152 35 31 -2.62 3.20 3.56 0.27
1977 153 37 35 -2.65 3.18 3.54 0.27



















FW FW noUS Demo-
cracy
Exconst Polcomp Openness
1979 159 35 29 -1.75 3.47 3.94 0.30
1980 160 33 31 -1.94 3.38 3.85 0.32
1981 162 34 28 -1.95 3.38 3.86 0.33
1982 162 39 34 -1.83 3.44 3.89 0.31
1983 163 40 28 -1.63 3.51 3.98 0.29
1984 164 46 42 -1.70 3.47 4.02 0.27
1985 164 47 43 -1.45 3.52 4.16 0.27
1986 166 46 42 -1.33 3.57 4.20 0.25
1987 166 72 68 -1.31 3.60 4.24 0.26
1988 166 46 41 -1.03 3.67 4.36 0.27
1989 166 23 21 -0.56 3.76 4.64 0.31
1990 169 13 11 0.55 4.13 5.19 0.32
1991 182 21 17 1.24 4.38 5.72 0.31
1992 183 24 22 1.92 4.52 5.97 0.31
1993 187 35 30 2.13 4.56 6.11 0.30
1994 186 42 36 2.42 4.64 6.25 0.32
1995 187 43 41 2.39 4.60 6.25 0.34
1996 187 44 41 2.28 4.58 6.24 0.35
1997 187 44 41 2.26 4.54 6.26 0.37
1998 187 28 23 2.42 4.60 6.43 0.36
1999 187 43 39 2.65 4.63 6.59 0.37
2000 187 32 25 2.89 4.70 6.66 0.41
2001 187 43 39 3.09 4.75 6.76 0.40
Sources:
FW: The Militarized Inter-State Disputes dataset, version 3.1, at
http://www.correlatesofwar.org, described by Ghosn et al. (2004). Disputes are coded from
level (1 no action) through 2 (threat of force), 3 (display of force), 4 (use of force), and 5
(war). We use all disputes of level 3 (the closing of a border or the dispatch of ships or
troops) and above.
Openness and # of countries: Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig (2008).
Democracy: the Polity2 (or net democracy), Exconst, and Polcomp variables from the
Polity IV dataset at http://www.systemicpeace.org, described by Marshall and Jaggers
(2007).4
Table A2. Unit root tests on FW (the frequency of pairwise conflicts)
Null Hypothesis: FW has a unit root
Exogenous: Constant
Bandwidth: 3 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel
Adj. t-Stat Prob.*
Phillips-Perron test statistic -2.915191 0.0463
Test critical values: 1% level -3.481217
5% level -2.883753
10% level -2.578694
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
Residual variance (no correction) 65.63298




Date: 01/17/11 Time: 09:05
Sample (adjusted): 1872 2001
Included observations: 130 after adjustments
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
FW_NEW(-1) -0.152393 0.047833 -3.185957 0.0018
C 3.267484 1.176782 2.776626 0.0063
R-squared 0.073473 Mean dependent var 0.292308
Adjusted R-squared 0.066235 S.D. dependent var 8.449069
S.E. of regression 8.164465 Akaike info criterion 7.052725
Sum squared resid 8532.287 Schwarz criterion 7.096840
Log likelihood -456.4271 Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.070650
F-statistic 10.15032 Durbin-Watson stat 2.230413
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0018135
Table A2 (continued).
Null Hypothesis: FW has a unit root
Exogenous: Constant
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=12)
t-Statistic Prob.*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.185957 0.0231
Test critical values: 1% level -3.481217
5% level -2.883753
10% level -2.578694
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(FW)
Method: Least Squares
Date: 01/17/11 Time: 09:08
Sample (adjusted): 1872 2001
Included observations: 130 after adjustments
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
FW(-1) -0.152393 0.047833 -3.185957 0.0018
C 3.267484 1.176782 2.776626 0.0063
R-squared 0.073473 Mean dependent var 0.292308
Adjusted R-squared 0.066235 S.D. dependent var 8.449069
S.E. of regression 8.164465 Akaike info criterion 7.052725
Sum squared resid 8532.287 Schwarz criterion 7.096840
Log likelihood -456.4271 Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.070650
F-statistic 10.15032 Durbin-Watson stat 2.230413
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0018136
Table A3. The trend in FW (pairwise conflict frequency), 1871-2001









df SS MS F
Regression 2 86.45 43.23 218.9




Error t Stat P-value
Intercept 0.6187 0.1233 5.017 1.71E-06
AR(1) 0.5344 0.0747 7.150 5.91E-11
time 0.009387 0.001827 5.139 1.01E-067
Table A4. The trend in FW no US (pairwise conflict frequency, excluding those involving the
United States), 1871-2001









df SS MS F
Regression 2 89.310 44.65 215.9




Error t Stat P-value
Intercept 0.5552 0.1152 4.820 4E-06
AR(1) 0.5419 0.07404 7.319 2.44E-11
t 0.009245 0.001855 4.983 1.99E-06